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DONALD NEIL MACCORMICK was born in Glasgow on 27 May 1941, the son 
of John MacCormick, a lawyer and leading Scottish nationalist, and of 
Margaret (née Miller), who was a social worker. He had an elder brother 
and two younger sisters. Neil showed academic promise at Glasgow High 
School and went on to obtain First Class Honours in Philosophy and 
Literature (MA 1963) at the University of Glasgow. He obtained a Snell 
Exhibition to Balliol College, Oxford in 1963, where he read Jurisprudence 
(BA First Class Honours, 1965; MA, 1969). He was President of the Union 
in 1965. Soon after graduation he accepted a teaching post in Jurisprudence 
at Queen’s College Dundee (then part of the University of St Andrews), 
intending to use it as a stepping stone to legal practice in Edinburgh. 
However, in 1967 he was elected to a Fellowship in Jurisprudence at Balliol 
(with a Lectureship at Corpus Christi College). He was called to the English 
Bar (Inner Temple) in 1971. In 1972, at the age of 31, he was appointed to 
the Regius Chair of Public Law and the Law of Nature and the Law of 
Nations at the University of Edinburgh, a position he held with great 
distinction until his retirement in 2007. Shortly after that he fell ill and 
was diagnosed with terminal cancer. He died at home in Edinburgh on 
5 April 2009 after a long illness during which he saw through the press the 
last volume of  his quartet of  books on Law, State and Practical Reason 
(1999–2008) that constitutes the summation of his thought in legal philos-
ophy. In 1965 he married Caroline Rona Barr. They had three daughters. 
After a divorce in 1992, he married Flora Margaret Britain (née Milne), 
who survives him. Among numerous honours, including several honorary 
degrees, he was elected as a Fellow of the British Academy in 1986, 
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knighted in recognition of ‘services to scholarship in Law’ in 2001 and 
was awarded the Royal Society of Edinburgh’s Gold Medal for Outstanding 
Achievement in 2004. 
This bare outline says almost nothing about his personality, his 
achievements or his activities beyond legal philosophy. Nevertheless, it is 
quite revealing. First, MacCormick’s initial grounding in philosophy 
focused on the Scottish enlightenment, traditional forms of moral theory 
(including neo-Kantianism), and logic and informal reasoning. This is 
crucial in interpreting his distinctive place in legal and political philoso-
phy. Second, he studied and taught English law in Oxford. He never 
formally studied, practiced or taught Scots law (except incidentally), but, 
largely self-taught, he wrote about it with acumen. Thus, although he was 
imbued from early on with Scottish history, politics, literature, and phil-
osophy, his legal background was mainly English. Third, his Edinburgh 
Chair with its sonorous title provided him with a prestigious platform and 
a congenial and secure base from which he could move out to engage in a 
wide range of activities—politics, university administration, public ser-
vice, as a visiting speaker in many places in Europe and North America, 
and not least as a public intellectual. Neil MacCormick’s academic repu-
tation rests largely on his teaching and writing in legal philosophy, but he 
was highly visible and widely liked and respected as a public ﬁgure not 
only in Scotland but also in the rest of the United Kingdom and in 
Continental Europe. He was, as one obituarist expressed it, a popular 
Scottish internationalist.
The many eulogies that poured in after Neil’s death tended to empha-
sise several traits: his energy, formidable intelligence, conviviality, humour, 
openness to other points of view, and generosity of spirit. In personal rela-
tions, with students, colleagues, and politicians of different persuasions, he 
was much liked, even loved, for his warmth and sympathetic interest. He 
earned praise for his many contributions to university administration. 
Popular anecdotes tell of a kilted MacCormick playing the bagpipes at 
many events, including the funeral of his lifelong friend, John Smith; of 
instances of professorial absent-mindedness; and of his Scottish accent 
bewildering foreigners when he waxed eloquent. I was a close personal 
friend and I witnessed how often, in his own phrase, he ‘added to the gaiety 
of nations’. My ﬁrst memory is playing energetic Frisbee with the newly 
appointed Regius Professor of the Law of Nature and the Law of Nations 
in the grounds of Belfast Castle during a symposium on constitutional 
law; later, of equally light-hearted games of ping pong, disquisitions on 
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single malts and Scottish history, and prolonged conversations about 
jurisprudence. 
Of course, he had faults. The most commonly voiced criticism was 
that he was sometimes ‘too nice’, ‘too reasonable’, ‘too accommodating’. 
Such generosity of spirit might indeed be a weakness in a captain of a ship 
or a prison governor or even a vice-chancellor. It could also be a fault in a 
legal philosopher, so the question arises: was he too accommodating, too 
generous with his praise, too ready to see other points of view? Or, worse 
still, was he eclectic? In a posthumously published paper Neil acknow-
ledged that his temperament tended towards the constructive-collaborative 
rather than the critical-dialectical or confrontational (MacCormick, 2011). 
He favoured charitable interpretation of other thinkers, openness to dif-
fering views and to criticism, sometimes himself  presenting a moving tar-
get. That he was a synthesiser is not in doubt—his attempts to reconcile 
Kant, Hume, Smith, and Stair are a prime example. His institutional 
theory of law is broad enough to accommodate non-state law, supra-
national law and even some forms of ‘soft law’. When I co-examined with 
him over many years in Edinburgh, Belfast, Warwick and London, I found 
him concerned to be fair and consistent, willing to listen carefully to con-
trary opinions, but not soft. Rather he was brisk and decisive. As one of 
his Ph.D. students put it, as a supervisor he was gentle, but not lenient. As 
a political speaker, while engaging, he could be robustly critical. Part of 
his appeal as a philosopher was his willingness both to adopt forthright 
positions and to change his mind, if  persuaded: Hume was wrong about 
reason being slave of the passions, but many of his insights are worth 
preserving. Neil’s rejection of will theories of rights, his emphasis that 
state law is only one kind of law, that self-determination is a relative mat-
ter, and his initial rejection and later partial defence of Ronald Dworkin’s 
‘one right answer’ thesis1 are all equally robust. His commitment to a 
gradualist, non-violent form of Scottish nationalism was unequivocal. 
Throughout his ﬁnal quartet Neil is concerned to assert clear, coherent 
positions and to justify them with vigorous arguments. Those positions 
are nearly always moderate, reasonable and reasoned, but, for the most 
part, they are neither eclectic nor equivocal.
1 His ﬁnal position on this last issue was equivocal; for example, in Questioning Sovereignty (1999, 
p. 6) he suggests that ‘sometimes or maybe even often’ there is an answer that is objectively better 
than its rivals.
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It is my impression that Neil read, then thought, then wrote largely 
from his head. Once, when we were collaborating on a joint paper, he 
came to stay the night. I had struggled for some weeks to produce the ﬁrst 
half  of a draft. That evening, we discussed what we thought and wanted 
to say over a bottle of single malt—I think Glemorangie was in favour 
that year. Next morning I had an appointment. As I was leaving he asked 
for some rough paper. By the time I returned two or three hours later he 
had completed the draft—scribbling over forty pages in longhand. When 
I revised it, I had occasionally to restrain his exuberance, and quietly edit 
out Scottishisms, but otherwise I altered very little. Many of his essays 
started as public lectures or conference papers and retain the style of oral 
delivery. The footnotes tend to be sparse, though carefully constructed. His 
prose is direct and clear, the mode argumentative rather than expository or 
interpretive. 
One aspect of Neil’s outside activities bears directly on his theoretical 
ideas: his involvement in politics. He was a life-long Scottish nationalist, 
he stood for election as a Scottish National Party (SNP) candidate in ﬁve 
Westminster elections—showing the ﬂag in hopeless constituencies—and 
then, more seriously, he served as an SNP Member of the European 
Parliament from 1999 to 2005. There is ample material for a full-scale bio-
graphy or even a detailed account of his political career. I shall deal with 
his ideas on nationalism and sovereignty below. Here his political involve-
ment is immediately relevant in three general respects. First, he developed 
a theory of social democracy largely through his studies of the political 
and intellectual history of Scotland. This theory was continuously tested, 
reﬁned and adjusted through experiences of practical politics. It found 
expression in many papers,2 and it pervades all four volumes of Law, State 
and Practical Reason. His political and legal philosophy is all of a piece. 
Second, his involvement with nationalist politics and the European Union 
required him to explore fundamental questions about both sovereignty 
and nationalism. He was often asked how he reconciled his general philo-
sophic position and his enthusiasm for the EU with his involvement in 
nationalist politics, especially in view of the unhappy history of national-
ism in twentieth-century Europe. Third, a concern for ‘practicality’ under-
lies all of MacCormick’s work: jurisprudence must be about law, not just 
abstract concepts; law is not merely an inert body of norms; how it is 
operationalised is a crucial part of understanding legal phenomena 
2 Some of his early essays are collected in Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982).
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(MacCormick, 2011); legal reasoning is a practice, not just a form of 
argumentation; sensitivity to both social and political context is crucial. 
Intellectual development 1963–1981
Neil’s academic career was remarkably stable—he occupied the same Chair 
for thirty-six years—but the development of his ideas was more complex. 
In some brief  autobiographical notes he summarised his intellectual 
development as follows:
Reduced to stages, I would say that 1965–81 was for me a period in which I was 
most closely engaged with Hart’s work, as a follower of his, though one with 
independent connections derived from other inﬂuences. 1981–1995 was a period 
of re-consideration of main themes and steady distancing from Hart, especially 
the later Hart. Since 1995 I have developed a rounded account of my own mature 
thought, having at its centre the post-positivist institutionalism developed in 
Institutions of Law, and ultimately to be underpinned by my book on practical 
reason in morality and law.
This is a useful rendering, but I shall suggest later that it over-emphasises 
his relationship with Herbert Hart and the signiﬁcance of his shift to 
‘post-positivism’. 
Neil ﬁrst arrived in Oxford as a student in 1963. His main tutors were 
Donald Harris, a New Zealander, who taught him English law and subse-
quently became the Director of the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 
and Alan Watson, a fellow Scot, a specialist in Roman Law and Comparative 
Law. Oxford was then the home of ordinary language philosophy, which 
was very different from what Neil had encountered in Glasgow, where 
W. D. Lamont’s lectures on political philosophy had been especially inﬂu-
ential. In 1952 H. L. A. Hart had moved from a Fellowship in Philosophy 
to the Corpus Chair of Jurisprudence. By 1963 Hart’s The Concept of Law 
(1961) had become, and has remained ever since, the starting-point for the 
study of Jurisprudence in Oxford and far beyond. As a student Neil 
attended two series of Hart’s lectures. When he returned to Oxford in 1967 
he had quite a lot of contact with him, but they never established a close 
personal relationship. He also had a close association with John Finnis, 
Richard Buxton, Brian Simpson, Joseph Raz, and, after Hart resigned his 
chair in 1968, with his successor Ronald Dworkin. Thus for about twenty 
years Neil moved in Hart’s circles, defended his positivist views, and was 
considered to be one of his leading disciples. 
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Neil was a proliﬁc speaker and writer. Until the late 1990s his academic 
reputation rested largely on his lectures and papers delivered in many coun-
tries and on four books that drew heavily on prior oral performances. An 
Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism (with Ota 
Weinberger, 1986) developed his general theory of law, ﬁrst expounded in 
his inaugural lecture in 1973, and most fully developed in Institutions of 
Law in 2007. This was the stable starting-point of his legal philosophy. In 
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978, 2nd edition 1994) he advanced a 
general theory of legal reasoning that he claimed was compatible with 
Hartian positivism. Some viewed it as presenting the kind of view Hart 
might have developed had he paid more attention to legal reasoning. This 
was one of MacCormick’s most successful works. It was clear, accessible, 
concrete, taking moderate, reﬂective positions on a wide range of issues. 
Students found it accessible and it attracted a lot of attention in Continental 
Europe. In 1982 he published a collection of essays on Legal Right and 
Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy, which advanced 
a rationalist liberal democratic ideology that steered a middle path between 
‘individualist Whiggery and Marxist collectivism’ (MacCormick, 1982: 8). 
This explored important ideas on social justice, legal rights and obligations, 
nationalism, the Scottish Enlightenment, and coercion. It was recognised as 
a signiﬁcant contribution to political theory. This book foreshadowed 
several of the central themes in Law, State and Practical Reason. Indeed 
some perceptive commentators suggest that some of these more discursive 
essays help to make the quartet more accessible. 
Towards the end of what MacCormick described as the ﬁrst phase of 
his intellectual development, he published an introduction to Hart’s ideas. 
The ﬁrst edition of H. L. A. Hart (1981) was very well-received and for a 
long time was considered the standard reference. It contained some criti-
cisms on points of detail, but was essentially sympathetic. However, Hart 
thought that it depicted him as closer to natural law than his own self-
perception and he hardened his positivist stance in the Postscript to The 
Concept of Law (1994). The second edition of MacCormick’s book (2008), 
while remaining scrupulously exact and fair, engages with controversies 
about Hart’s works and provides some rather clear clues about MacCormick’s 
own intellectual trajectory.
 DONALD NEIL MACCORMICK 455
1981–1997
By the time he was elected to the British Academy in 1986 these four early 
books, together with his lectures and essays, had established a consider-
able international reputation for him as a very substantial legal philoso-
pher. In them he had set out carefully argued positions on the nature of 
law, legal reasoning, political theory, and Scottish nationalism. From 1981 
to 1997 he devoted most of his energies to academic administration and 
nationalist politics. This was hardly a fallow period intellectually, for he 
continued to lecture and write, but his intellectual agenda was less clear. 
There were, however, two signiﬁcant developments in his perspective on 
legal philosophy. First, he invested a great deal of time in studying and 
teaching about the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, deepening his 
study of Hume, Stair and Adam Smith and extending his knowledge of 
several other ﬁgures. Second, largely through the World Congress of 
Social and Legal Philosophy, he came into contact with leading jurists in 
Continental Europe. He had met Chaim Perelman (Brussels), the pioneer 
of ‘the new rhetoric’ and the precursor of modern argumentation theory. 
Neil was attracted by his ideas on informal logic and translated some of 
his work. In 1979 he invested time in improving his command of German. 
He collaborated with Ota Weinberger (Graz) and worked closely, among 
others, with Robert Alexy (Germany), Aulis Aarnio (Helsinki), and 
Aleksander Peczenik (Lund). Later he ﬂirted with the systems theory of 
Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
in collaboration with Robert Summers and Zenon Bankowski, he became 
involved in comparative work on legal reasoning and interpretation. This 
culminated in two outstanding edited volumes of essays on precedent and 
statutory interpretation, based on a series of workshops, known as the 
‘Bielefelder Kreis’ (MacCormick and Summers, 1991 and 1997). Thus 
during this period he returned to his intellectual roots in the Scottish 
Enlightenment and added a distinctive European and comparative dimen-
sion, while experiencing what he called a ‘steady distancing from Hart’. In 
2008 he summed up his view of Hart as follows:
Hart’s greatest and most enduring insight concerns the need to understand rule-
governed conduct from the ‘internal point of view’. This is essential to develop-
ing a clear and convincing theory of norms—but rules are only one kind of 
norm. The analysis of law as a union of primary and secondary rules, though 
full of valuable insight, is in the end incomplete and unsatisfactory. A fresh start 
is needed. A version of a ‘basic norm theory’ is more satisfactory than a ‘rule of 
recognition’ theory in explaining how a legal system comes together in the 
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framework of a constitutionalist state (Rechtsstaat, Estado de derecho). Legal 
institutions interface with politics and economics and are foundational for the 
state and also for civil society. Criminal law is one essential part of the founda-
tions of social peace and thus of civil society. All this takes one quite far from 
the Hartian conception of law, though the development out of a Hartian posi-
tion is easily traced. Law and morality are indeed conceptually distinct, but it 
remains also true that minimal elements of respect for justice are essential to the 
recognition of a normative order as ‘legal’ in character. (Autobiographical 
Notes, unpublished, 2008)
The quartet: Law, State and Practical Reason (1999–2008)
In 1997 Neil shed his administrative load and started again to concentrate 
on legal philosophy. He planned to reconsider his position on the main 
themes of legal, political and moral theory and to develop ‘a rounded 
account of my own mature thought’. He formulated a hugely ambitious 
project for a work in four volumes on Law, State and Practical Reason and 
applied for and obtained a ﬁve-year Research Professorship from the 
Leverhulme Trust. He completed Questioning Sovereignty in 1999, before 
his tenure of the Leverhulme Fellowship was interrupted by his election as 
an SNP Member of the European Parliament. From 1999 to 2004 he had 
almost no time for academic work. Fortunately, when he stepped down as 
an MEP his Leverhulme Professorship was revived and thereafter he 
was able to concentrate on Law, State and Practical Reason. He did this 
with renewed enthusiasm and commitment. Two further volumes were 
completed before his formal retirement in 2007. Shortly after that he fell 
ill and the ﬁnal volume was mainly written during that last illness.
This is not the place to attempt a detailed analysis or evaluation of 
each book in MacCormick’s impressive quartet. Instead, I shall brieﬂy 
describe three of the volumes, give a more detailed account of his ideas on 
nationalism, sovereignty and self-determination, and then advance an 
assessment of the distinctiveness and signiﬁcance of his contributions as 
a whole. 
Institutions of Law
Institutions of Law (2007) was the third in time of the quartet to be pub-
lished, but it was conceived as its lynchpin in that it set out his theory of 
law as a contribution to general jurisprudence, with the other three vol-
umes as elaborations of the underpinnings of his philosophy of law and of 
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particular aspects, such as sovereignty, practical reasoning, and a theory of 
justice.
He ﬁrst expounded his institutional theory of law in his inaugural lec-
ture at Edinburgh (MacCormick, 1973). Later he developed it in collabo-
ration with Ota Weinberger (MacCormick and Weinberger, 1985, 1986) 
and he reﬁned and adjusted it over the years in many papers. His central 
idea, that law is institutionalised normative order, remained constant, but 
Institutions of Law is much more than a restatement and elaboration of 
his early ideas. 
The starting-point for MacCormick’s theory was a distinction between 
‘brute facts’ and ‘institutional facts’, advanced by Elizabeth Anscombe 
and John Searle (especially in Anscombe, 1958, and Searle, 1959) as part of 
speech act theory. ‘Brute facts’ appear to exist in the world entirely inde-
pendent of human thought or values; they are ‘sheer physical facts’: ‘insti-
tutional facts’ also exist, but their existence presupposes human thought 
and institutions. A credit card, a system of scoring in sport, courts, the 
Scottish law of obligations, and a particular contract all exist—they are 
facts—but they exist by virtue of human norms.
For MacCormick law is one species of  the genus normative order, viz. 
institutional normative order. This is an ‘explanatory deﬁnition’ which 
requires the elaboration of  three elements—‘normative’, ‘order’, and 
‘institution’. MacCormick uses the example of  queuing to illustrate these 
concepts and to introduce some central themes. In some cultures queuing 
is a practice that is well-understood by nearly all participants even if  they 
are total strangers. In some contexts, for example waiting for a bus or at 
a supermarket checkout, people form a line in an orderly way in order to 
take turns. This is a form of activity that is a mutually coordinated prac-
tice, a social-moral institution that is governed by norms. The existence 
of  the practice depends on a fairly high degree of  understanding and 
compliance by the participants. There are norms for turn-taking and 
against ‘queue-barging’, with possible exceptions, for example in emer-
gencies or for particular classes of  people. The norms may be implicit or 
they may be informally or formally articulated. They can even be formal-
ised and managed by authority. Queuing is an institutionalised practice, a 
particular queue is an instance of that practice. In some cultures queuing 
is a relatively stable normative practice with many variations. The Scottish 
law of  contract and a contract under that law are both institutional 
facts:
The existence of  the institution as such is relative to a given legal system, and 
depends upon whether or not the system contains an appropriate set of  
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institutive, consequential and terminative rules. If  it does, then the occurrence 
of given events or the performance of given acts has by virtue of the rules the 
effect of bringing into being the existence of the institution. (MacCormick 
and Wienberger, 1986: 66)
Legal phenomena as institutional facts are of different kinds: they can be 
institution-agencies (e.g. courts, legislatures), institution-arrangements 
(e.g. property, criminal law), or institution things (e.g. contracts, rights to 
futures). All are normative, institutionalised, and concerned with ordering 
relations. 
Institutions of Law is presented in four parts: Part 1 analyses the cen-
tral concepts of the theory. Part 2, ‘Persons, Acts and Relations’, focuses 
on basic legal concepts (persons, property, rights, powers etc.). This looks 
rather like a revival of the kind of particularistic English analytical juris-
prudence that gave way to the more philosophical approach of Herbert 
Hart, but it also has echoes of Roman and Scottish institutional writings. 
Part 3, ‘Law, State and Civil Society’, explores the constitutive role of law 
in relation to law and politics, fundamental rights, criminal law and law 
and economy. Part 4, ‘Law, Morality, and Methodology’, revisits legal 
positivism, the relationship between law and justice, and the methodology 
of  analytical jurisprudence. MacCormick claimed that Institutions of 
Law brought his general theory of law up to date in an avowedly ‘post-
positivistic’ form (see below), developing an interpretative approach to 
analytical jurisprudence that is fully in tune with some major recent 
developments in the sociology of  law and socio-legal studies more 
generally. 
MacCormick uses the example of queuing to introduce some general 
themes. First, the implicit formalisation by authority, for example in man-
aging a checkout, represents a second tier of institutionalisation of a pre-
existing normative practice. Humans are norm-users before they are 
norm-givers (Institutions, 284–8). Second, implicit norms are not the same 
as hard-and-fast rules. They come into existence in complex ways through 
human interactions involving expectations, practices, values and mutual 
understandings. Third, Hart had illuminatingly distinguished between the 
concepts of ‘a habit’ and ‘a rule’. The former is used to describe actual 
behaviour, the latter is normative. MacCormick emphasises that rules can 
exist as institutional facts independently of the extent to which norm users 
habitually comply with them. There may be a gap between our expecta-
tions of queuing and participants’ actual behaviour. In respect of the 
familiar ‘gap’ between law in books and law in action, a central concern of 
the sociology of law, he distinguishes between a ‘knowledge gap’ and an 
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‘efﬁcacy gap’ (p. 71). For practising lawyers, knowledge of the law in books 
is rarely enough and existence of rules is independent of their efﬁcacy or 
enforcement. Understanding law cannot be solely a matter of rules.
The institutional theory of law addresses basic ontological and episte-
mological issues about the nature of law and claims explicitly to transcend 
any sharp divide between analytical and empirical jurisprudence and 
between doctrinal and socio-legal studies. MacCormick acknowledged to 
me that it was quite close to the law-jobs theory of the American jurist, 
Karl Llewellyn. Some of the ideas are controversial (for example, I have 
reservations about the concept of ‘institution’ in this context), but the 
claim is justiﬁed. MacCormick’s main approach is conceptual, but with-
out espousing extreme versions of ‘naturalism’ in philosophy, he insisted 
that analytical, moral, and empirical studies are all necessary to under-
standing law and are interrelated. He strongly rejected Ronald Dworkin’s 
view that empirical questions about law are neither philosophically inter-
esting nor of practical importance. (e.g. Dworkin, 2006: 98; MacCormick, 
2009: 187–90).
MacCormick’s principal focus of attention was liberal democratic 
constitutional states (the Rechstaat). They embody the most important 
form of law and the one that offers the best prospect of realising the Rule 
of Law, human rights, and other liberal democratic values. However, his 
conception of law was very broad and explicitly allowed for non-state law. 
The institutional theory provides conceptual space for treating as ‘legal’ 
many different forms of coordination and ordering that are becoming 
salient at supranational, transnational and subnational levels in an era of 
‘globalisation’. MacCormick acknowledged, although he did not pursue 
in detail, the existence and signiﬁcance of the complex phenomena of 
legal pluralism, that is the co-existence, from the point of view of norm-
users, of two or more legal orders in the same time-space context. 
Accordingly, his approach to jurisprudence ﬁts modern concerns arising 
from increasing transnational interdependence far better than narrower, 
state-centric theories of law.
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law
MacCormick regularly stressed ‘the arguable character of law’. He 
believed strongly in the importance of reason in both morality and law. 
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law is in part a successor to Legal Reasoning and 
Legal Theory, marking a shift from a Hartian towards a Dworkinian view 
on some much-debated issues. Perhaps because considerable space is 
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devoted to replying to critics, some commentators still prefer the earlier 
work as being more approachable for non-specialists. However, the 
changes are signiﬁcant. First, MacCormick shifts from a robust positiv-
ism to a position close to Ronald Dworkin’s, notably that there is often a 
single right answer to a disputed question of law even in the hardest cases 
and that answer is based on deep probing of underlying moral principles.3 
MacCormick, however, did not go as far as Dworkin in commitment to an 
objectivist morality. Second, in the later book he clariﬁed his views on the 
role of deduction in legal reasoning and fruitfully expanded his analysis 
of three types of argument used in second-order justiﬁcation—coherence, 
consistency and consequences. Third, under the inﬂuence of the new rhet-
oric of Chaim Perelman and associates, he gave more attention to the 
persuasiveness of non-demonstrative arguments and their role in legal 
justiﬁcation. He also devoted two chapters to coherence and narrative, 
important topics which he might have explored much further if  he had 
lived. 
Practical Reason in Law and Morality
This last book in the quartet was published shortly before his death. It does 
not show signs of haste, but he would probably have preferred more time 
to work on it. The book is the vehicle for the fullest statement of his moral 
philosophy and the underpinnings of what he called ‘post-positivism’.
Practical Reason in Law and Morality can be read as a sequel to Legal 
Right and Social Democracy. It builds on but does not replace the earlier 
work. Its emphasis is more moral than political and it explores in greater 
depth issues relating to individual autonomy, universalism and particular-
ism in moral judgements, empathy, objectivity, and the role of reason in 
public life. It is a contribution to ethics, linked speciﬁcally to his legal 
theory through a comparison of moral and legal reasoning and further 
probing of the relationship between law and morality. The central question 
of the book is: can reason be practical? MacCormick (2008: 4; cf. p. 209) 
answers: ‘Most certainly it can!’ This book returns to his early engage-
ment with the Scottish Enlightenment and Kant. MacCormick seeks to 
reconcile Smith’s moral sentiments with Kant’s categorical imperative and 
to outline a theory of justice that goes beyond his Scottish precursors to 
address issues of distributive justice, the environment, and future genera-
tions, topics that have engaged late twentieth-century philosophers. A 
3 See above, n. 1.
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notable feature of the book is a lengthy examination of the Scottish nat-
ural law tradition, exempliﬁed by Stair. MacCormick prefers Stair’s version 
of natural law to Benthamite utilitarianism, but he still rejects the label of 
‘natural lawyer’ for himself. 
Nation, nationalism and sovereignty
My own father used to be set on his grandmother’s knee in a humble house in 
Mull and asked, ‘Co tha thu (Who are you?)’; ‘Cha n-eil fhios agam (I don’t 
know)’; ‘Is tu Iain mac Dhomhunuill ‘ic Neill ‘ic Iain ‘ic Dhughaill. . . (You are 
John, son of Donald, son of Neil, son of John, son of Dugald’—and so on went 
the genealogy up to thirty-three generations). (MacCormick, 1982: 252)
Neil MacCormick’s quartet is written in a clear, uncluttered style. However, 
it is mostly of specialised interest to jurists, political theorists, and moral 
philosophers. Questioning Sovereignty is an exception because it deals 
with contemporary political issues of general interest and great impor-
tance—self-determination, Scottish nationalism, democracy, the decline 
of sovereignty, and the future of Europe. It is underpinned by Neil’s life-
long commitment to Scottish nationalism and his extensive experience of 
practical politics. I share the view that this is his most important and 
original book.
Neil was born and bred a nationalist. The MacCormicks came from 
Mull. Although her husband’s exploits sometimes worried her, his mother 
was also a committed nationalist. But it was his father who was the sem-
inal inﬂuence on his politics. John MacCormick (1904–61), popularly 
known as ‘King John’, is an iconic but controversial ﬁgure in the history 
of Scottish nationalism. Born in Glasgow, he became involved in politics 
while he was a law student. He was a founding member of the National 
Party of Scotland in 1928 and of the Scottish National Party in 1934. In 
1942 he split from the SNP to found the broader, non-party Scottish 
Convention which produced the Scottish Covenant, a moderate document 
supporting self-government rather than full independence. The Covenant 
obtained over two million signatories and helped to raise the proﬁle and 
broaden the base of Scottish nationalism. In 1950–1, while Rector of the 
University of Glasgow and a respected lawyer, John MacCormick took 
considerable risks by involving himself  in the ‘repatriation’ of the Stone 
of Destiny from Westminster Abbey and the aftermath.4 In 1952–3, with 
4 See J. MacCormick (1955) and Hamilton (2008).
462 William Twining
Ian Hamilton, he instituted a famous Scottish legal action (MacCormick 
v Lord Advocate), contesting the right of Queen Elizabeth to be styled 
Elizabeth II in Scotland. Although the petition was unsuccessful, it suc-
ceeded in challenging the idea that the Westminster Parliament could 
repeal or alter fundamental conditions of the Act of Union. Lord President 
Cooper in the Court of Session famously expressed the opinion that the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty was an English idea that was not 
part of Scottish constitutional law. John MacCormick was a quiet prag-
matic lawyer, deeply committed to an evolutionary approach to self-
government rather than the more confrontational, fundamentalist politics 
favoured by many nationalists. When he had time he wrote poetry and 
painted. His detractors tended to write him off as an inconsistent com-
promiser and as a failure, but his role in widening the political base of 
Scottish nationalism and in furthering the cause of gradualism paid off  in 
the long run. Devolution in 1999, and even aspects of the current policies 
and style of the SNP, owe much to his inﬂuence. 
The MacCormick home in Park Quadrant, Glasgow was imbricated 
with Scottish history, Scottish literature and Scottish nationalist activi-
ties. Holidays were spent in the Scottish countryside. Neil was ten when 
the Stone of  Destiny was ‘liberated’ from Westminster Abbey; he was 12 
at the time of  MacCormick v the Lord Advocate, and during his teens he 
listened avidly to many conversations about Scottish affairs and politics. 
It was ‘a great political education in a very particular kind of  politics’.5 
Later his elder brother Iain represented Argyll for ﬁve years as an SNP 
MP in Westminster. Neil added two dimensions to his political heritage: 
philosophy as a profession and engagement with Europe.
In politics Neil followed a similar trajectory to his father: he was 
passionately committed to Scotland, but he was a gradualist, willing to 
compromise and rejecting atavistic and destructive forms of  national-
ism. He was fond of  quoting his father’s friend, the novelist Neil Gunn 
of  Inverness:
We constantly reafﬁrmed our faith, not in any narrow and bitter nationalism, 
but in the capacity of the Scottish people, given the chance, to reconcile in their 
politics the freedom and human dignity of every individual with such mass 
organization as modern technocracy has made inevitable.6
His family was not the only inﬂuence on Neil’s nationalism. In addi-
tion to his intellectual forebears he was part of a remarkable generation of 
5 Neil MacCormick, Introduction to J. MacCormick, The Flag in the Wind (2008)
6 Cited by Neil MacCormick, The Scotsman, 20 Nov. 1974.
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politicians and intellectuals, who are becoming recognised as a broader 
‘Scottish renaissance’, that included Ken Alexander, Neal Ascherson, 
Donald Dewar, John P. Mackintosh, Tom Nairn, and John Smith. All of 
these have contributed to a climate of opinion that supports a distinctive 
literature, a sophisticated version of social democracy, and a moderate 
form of nationalism in Scotland and beyond. 
From an early stage Neil had to confront tensions between his commit-
ments to nationalism, political individualism, democracy, and the project 
for a European Union. In 1979 he published an essay on ‘Nations and 
nationalism’,7 which introduced three themes that form the core of his later 
writings on the subject: ﬁrst, explicit acknowledgement and rejection of 
‘the dark side of  nationalism’—exclusive, parochial, playing on hatred 
of  others; second, recognition that moderate love of family, country, col-
leagues and co-religionists are not only grounds of identity but are also the 
basis for recognition ‘as equally legitimate (because the same in kind) the 
love others bear for their own’ (MacCormick, 1982: 253); and, third, 
nationalism is historically and conceptually independent of the idea of the 
sovereign state—a late-comer that ‘may have already had its day’ (p. 264). 
For the next thirty years Neil developed these themes in academic 
writings, newspaper articles, political tracts and speeches, culminating in 
Questioning Sovereignty (1999). This book weaves together twelve essays 
on constitutional and political themes, all written in the 1990s, a period 
that saw important—some would say revolutionary—developments within 
the United Kingdom and Europe, including moves towards devolution, the 
seeming abandonment of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty,8 the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties (1992, 
1997), the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and a greatly increased 
consciousness of ‘globalisation’. 
Questioning Sovereignty is a philosophical work which intellectualises 
some heated political issues. A work of  political imagination, it sets out 
a clearly argued vision of the constitutional future for the European 
Community, Scotland, the United Kingdom and for social democracies 
generally. It is informed by a passionate commitment to social democracy 
and the Scottish nationalist cause, but it is presented with remarkable 
detachment.
The book starts with a restatement of the theory of law as institution-
alised normative order and ranges widely over important issues, many of 
7 Reprinted as chapter 13 of Legal Right and Social Democracy (1982).
8 Factortame v Secretary of State for Transport [1991] A. C. 603.
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them controversial. The core of the book centres on the elucidation and 
analysis of the relations between ﬁve concepts that are captured by the full 
title: Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth. He summarised his mature philosophical position as 
follows:
. . . To [the idea of ‘liberal nationalism’] the idea of civic nationalism is strongly 
material. ‘Civic nationalism’ identiﬁes the nation in terms of its members’ shared 
allegiance to certain civic institutions. These are understood in broad terms to 
include, for example, legal norms and institutions, political representative 
organs, branches of public and local administration, the organization of educa-
tion, churches and religious communities in their secular aspect, and other like 
institutions having an understood territorial location to which they refer. 
Institutions of civil society as much as of the state are relevant here. Territorially 
located civic institutions can be objects of allegiance, understood as ‘ours’ by 
the people among whom they perform their functions. As civic institutions, they 
are necessarily of great political signiﬁcance to the community which, to an 
extent, they deﬁne. (MacCormick, 1999: 120) 
and
Naturally, it is possible, and perhaps desirable, for such civic institutions to go 
the length of including a constitution and the full panoply of statehood. Perhaps 
without that the civic quality of civic institutions is too precarious. But it would 
be a mistake to require this by deﬁnition, for to do so is simply to endorse the 
in-principle challenged assumption that the states that currently exist comprise 
also the totality of nations, at any rate, the totality of nations that can be under-
stood in the civic sense. Whether or not the civic nation is or has a state, or a 
fortiori an independent sovereign state, the point of the idea of a civic nation is 
that it is in principle open to voluntary membership. The community deﬁned by 
allegiance to institutions is open to anyone who chooses to dwell in the territory 
and give allegiance to the institutions. Departure to a different place and differ-
ent allegiances is also possible, and not traitorous. One is guilty of treachery 
only if  one who remains in place and surreptitiously undermines the institutions 
of that place while ostensibly giving them respect and allegiance. (MacCormick, 
1999: 170)
Questioning Sovereignty addresses a wide range of topics, including: 
the changing nature of constitutionalism, sovereignty as an outdated con-
cept, the European Union as a sui generis form of legal order, jurisdictional 
competence, legal pluralism, mixed constitutions, democracy, democratic 
deﬁcits, subsidiarity, individual and national autonomy, self-determination, 
the Rechstaat and the rule of law, and Europe as a Commonwealth of 
Commonwealths. Highlights include a critique of the idea that the state 
has a monopoly on political and legal forms, coupled with endorsement of 
the importance of the democratic constitutional state (Rechtstaat), and 
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the relativisation of the concepts of sovereignty, independence and self-
determination. His differentiation of four types of subsidiarity—commu-
nal, comprehensive, market and rational legislative—has also been widely 
recognised as a major contribution. The last chapter suggests a new form 
of Union within Europe with a Council of the British Isles, preserving 
those elements of cooperation and interdependence that ‘have worked’, to 
be achieved through peaceful negotiation and mutual good will. The book 
ends:
General principles do not settle concrete cases, and the settlement of this kind 
of case is a matter for political process, in which the philosopher has no larger a 
voice than anyone else. (MacCormick, 1999: 204)
Neil MacCormick was a politician as well as a philosopher. Questioning 
Sovereignty was published in 1999, the year in which he was elected to the 
European Parliament. By then some of his essays and lectures had aroused 
considerable interest in Europe.9 So he entered full-time politics after 
he had articulated a coherent political and constitutional philosophy. 
This informed his activities and greatly enhanced his standing within the 
European Community. He entered into his role with both energy and 
enthusiasm. He loved the work and did not mind the acclaim. He served on 
several committees, represented the SNP on the Convention on the Future 
of Europe, and involved himself in many speciﬁc issues. He was particu-
larly proud of his pamphlet Who’s Afraid of a European Constitution? 
(2005). He nursed his constituency, which not inappropriately was the whole 
of Scotland, fought some important battles regarding ferries for the island 
communities, and was Vice-President of the SNP from 1999 until 2004. He 
was voted Scottish MEP of the Year three times. After ﬁve frenetic years he 
returned to academic life, partly because the experience had been exhaust-
ing, partly because he missed his students, but mainly to complete his mag-
num opus. However, he was delighted to be appointed Special Adviser to 
the First Minister, Alex Salmond, after the 2007 Scottish Parliament 
Elections. He was consulted frequently, but he would probably have been 
more active in that role had he not been ill.
How far did his political actions reﬂect his philosophical ideas? This is 
a complex question, not least because of the extraordinary energy that 
Neil invested in his role as an MEP. The inventory of the archive of his 
papers in the University of Edinburgh, which mainly documents his polit-
ical activities, runs to over 200 pages. There is plenty of scope for detailed 
9 Notably the Chorley Lecture of 1992, ‘Beyond the sovereign state’ (MacCormick, 1993), and 
his writings on subsidiarity.
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research into how far his practice matched his theory. My general impres-
sion is that at a general level they were remarkably close. This is illustrated 
by some signiﬁcant changes of position on the ultimate goal of Scottish 
nationalism: in 1970 he stated that he was ‘unconvinced’ that full inde-
pendence should be the ultimate goal for Scotland, even in the long run 
(The Scottish Debate, 1970, Introduction). In 1989 Neil supported The 
Claim of Right that helped pave the way for devolution a decade later and 
he strongly opposed the SNP’s boycott of a cross-party movement for 
self-government, thereby repeating his father’s gradualism.10 Yet over time 
he came round slowly to support the SNP’s end goal of independence and 
was publicly associated with the SNP’s draft constitution for an independ-
ent Scotland from the mid-1980s. He justiﬁed his gradualism on demo-
cratic grounds—the Scottish people needed to be persuaded—and he 
interpreted ‘independence’ in the relativist terms of his philosophical posi-
tion on ‘post-sovereignty’ and interdependence. Questioning Sovereignty 
concludes by acknowledging that while MacCormick the politician had 
campaigned for independence for Scotland in the long run, MacCormick 
the philosopher recognised that this is one among a range of reasonable 
options that can be chosen by the Scottish people.11 
Conclusion
Neil MacCormick was one of the leading legal philosophers of the twen-
tieth century. His view of philosophy was broad and closely linked to the 
idea of liberal education in the Scottish University tradition.12 In his 
Presidential Address to the Society of Public Teachers of Law in 1984 he 
endorsed this holistic view and was highly critical of those who restrict the 
idea of Jurisprudence to abstract philosophy, laying themselves open to 
the criticism ‘that they lack any real interest in real law’ (MacCormick, 
1985: 181). 
He was a proliﬁc writer. Of his many publications, the quartet Law, 
State and Practical Reason stands out as his most distinctive achievement. 
It is one of the most extensive and intellectually ambitious contributions 
to jurisprudence in recent times. It advances a general theory of law as 
institutional normative order, an in-depth study of sovereignty, statehood, 
10 Especially in ‘Unrepentant gradualism’ (1989).
11 MacCormick (1999), p. 204. 
12 He greatly admired George Davie’s seminal work The Democratic Intellect (1961).
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and nationalism, a theory of legal reasoning and the role of rhetoric 
within legal argumentation, and an account of practical reasoning in law 
and morality. Some ﬁnal statements at the end of a successful scholarly 
career add little to earlier work and can even be dismissed as ‘old men’s 
books’. MacCormick’s quartet, by contrast, is intellectually ambitious, 
contains much that is new, including signiﬁcant changes of position, and 
presents a coherent and distinctive vision of law in today’s world. It is a 
masterly synthesis and much else besides. It does not entirely supercede 
his earlier works, some of which are more detailed or more ebullient, but 
it will almost certainly be the main focus of attention for commentators in 
the foreseeable future.
The institutional theory of law is a distinctive theory about the nature 
of law. Although it grew out of philosophical concerns, one of his aims 
was to lessen the divide between analytical and empirical jurisprudence. 
Herbert Hart had advanced a ‘social fact’ conception of law, but had 
retreated from its implications. Moreover he conﬁned his attention to state 
law. MacCormick sought not only to build bridges with the social sci-
ences, both personally and institutionally,13 but he also recognised that the 
models of state legal systems constructed or assumed by most mainstream 
jurists sit uneasily with forms of law or law-like phenomena with which 
legal scholars and practitioners are increasingly concerned, especially 
public international law, regional law, religious law, customary law and 
various forms of ‘soft law’. The institutional theory is one of the most 
developed attempts to provide an alternative model of legal ordering that 
is both empirically sensitive and broad enough to encompass ideas of 
non-state law and legal pluralism, and to provide a theoretical framework 
for viewing and studying a wide range of phenomena in this era of 
‘globalisation’. 
It is ironic that having embraced an empirically oriented view of  law 
as a species of  social institution, the later MacCormick claimed to reject, 
or at least to move beyond, legal positivism. In the end he called himself  
a ‘post-positivist’. By this he meant that he considered morality and 
positive law (state law is ‘posited’) to be conceptually distinct, but there 
are moral limits to what is conceptually reasonable about the idea of  
institutional normative order: ‘Extremes of  injustice are incompatible 
with law’ (MacCormick, 2007: Preface). I have argued elsewhere that he 
exaggerated the signiﬁcance of his defection from positivism and that his 
13 He helped to found the Centre for the Social and Philosophical Study of Law in the 1980s and, 
as Provost, did much to encourage cross-disciplinary work.
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post-positivist insistence on a moral dimension to law may ﬁt participant-
oriented perspectives suitable for a committed politician or jurist concerned 
to make her own system the best it can be, but it sits uneasily with outsider 
perspectives such as those of  historians, comparatists or observers of  
foreign legal orders and regimes that are the products of other people’s 
power (Twining, 2009).
MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning, as developed in Rhetoric and 
the Rule of Law, stands out in a crowded ﬁeld both for its philosophical 
sophistication and for its closeness to the actual practices of appellate 
courts in the common law tradition through the detailed analysis of actual 
cases. His ﬁnal position is close to both Ronald Dworkin and Robert 
Alexy, perhaps the two most prominent thinkers on the topic. Regrettably, 
he followed convention in restricting his attention almost entirely to rea-
soning about questions of law, but he did acknowledge that other kinds of 
reasonings in legal contexts—for example in relation to issues of fact and 
of disposition (e.g. sentencing)—also merit serious theoretical attention. 
His ideas on coherence, which he was still developing towards the end of 
his life, have particular relevance to inferential reasoning from evidence.
Law, State and Practical Reason also contains many speciﬁc insights. 
Of course, not all of MacCormick’s moral, political, and jurisprudential 
ideas are original or distinctive, though even his more orthodox con-
clusions have a particular Scottish ﬂavour. In addition to Questioning 
Sovereignty, many of his more speciﬁc writings on Europe, Scottish 
nationalism, constitutionalism, and rights are of general interest. 
In his autobiographical notes MacCormick deﬁned his intellectual 
development in terms of his relations with Herbert Hart. But there is a 
danger that the quartet Law, State and Practical Reason will be read and 
criticised in terms of the narrow perspectives and repetitious debates that 
have characterised much analytical legal philosophy since the publication 
of The Concept of Law. Neil MacCormick is very much more than a 
lapsed Hartian and a near convert to natural law. It is important to spell 
out the reasons for this. First, as we have seen, in Edinburgh he returned 
to his intellectual roots which were far removed from analytical positiv-
ism. Nationalism, the Scottish enlightenment, and, to a lesser extent, Kant 
and Kelsen were central to his concerns throughout his career. In my view, 
he was never a ‘hard’ positivist. Second, MacCormick and Hart were both 
social democrats with quite similar commitments to democracy, the rule 
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of law, and (Hart less clearly) to human rights. But they arrived at their 
views by different routes and MacCormick’s ethical and political views 
are much more fully worked out and integrated with his legal theory than 
were Hart’s. Third, MacCormick was much more in sympathy with socio-
legal studies and empirical understandings of law than Hart, Raz, Dworkin, 
or Finnis. Hart shared Oxford’s prejudice against sociology and was an 
ambivalent supporter of socio-legal studies; Dworkin dismisses sociology 
of law as marginal and philosophically uninteresting; all four take a quite 
narrow view of what is involved in understanding law. MacCormick, on 
the other hand, while not himself  engaging much in empirical research, 
was not only strongly supportive of it in Edinburgh (e.g. MacCormick, 
1976), but made it part of his institutional theory of law. This was not 
merely an example of his concern for inclusiveness; it is philosophically 
grounded in the Scottish Enlightenment, especially Adam Smith, whom he 
recognised as a forerunner of ‘law in context’ approaches (e.g. MacCormick, 
1982: 116–17). Finally, there is an important European and comparative 
dimension, which is quite rare in legal philosophy. It was natural for a 
Scottish jurist educated in English law to transcend the common law–civil 
law divide.
WILLIAM TWINING
Fellow of the Academy
Note. Detailed assessments and criticisms of MacCormick’s contribution and espe-
cially of Law, State and Practical Reason have only recently begun to emerge. Four 
books devoted to aspects of his work have recently been published (Bankowski and 
MacLean, 2006; Menéndez and Fossum, 2011; Del Mar and Bankowski, 2009; and 
Walker, 2012). There have been numerous articles, with more in preparation. It is 
to be hoped that there will in time be a full biography that will do justice to Neil 
MacCormick’s contributions not only as a jurist but also as a teacher, politician, 
public intellectual and citizen of both Scotland and Europe.
 I am particularly grateful to Flora MacCormick, Zenon Bankowski, Maksymilian 
Del Mar and Andrew Halpin for help with preparing this memoir. I am also indebted 
to many of Neil’s colleagues and associates, especially Hector McQueen, FBA, Neil 
Walker, FBA, and Claudio Michelon. I have been much assisted by some unpublished 
‘autobiographical notes’ and the comprehensive Bibliography by Maksymilian Del Mar, 
which contains an invaluable appendix on ‘Scottish themes’.
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